This paper is a methodological critique of the Coleman Report (James S. Coleman~M. Equality 9!. Educational Opportunity, U.S. Office of Education, 1966). The Cain-Watts criticism is directed towards the statistical methods used,~to th~report's substantive findings.
Introduction
The aim of the Coleman Report [1] is twofold--{a)~o describe certain aspects of our educational system, and .(b) to analyze the way it is related to educational achievement--with the objective of prescribing policies to change the system. In its purely descriptive aspects, the Coleman Report presents a very dismal picture of the effectiveness of our educational system in securing equal opportunities for all our citizens. Looking at educational outcomes for children from different backgrounds one finds wide discrepancies which the American dream has assumed capable of elimination through the public school system. These discrepancies have been authoritatively established in the Coleman Report, and the indictment and challenge they present are-a crucial contribution. Although we take a critical view of this Report, nothing in our subsequent commentary can detract from the importance of the findings regarding the inequalities in the education of children of different races, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes.
Our criticism of the Report is directed toward its analysis, mainly found in Chapter 3, in which an implicit theory of the determinants of educational achievement is posited, tested, and used to -point up prescriptive policy implications. The principal theme of our discussion is that the analytical part of the Coleman Report has The remainder of the paper is organized around the development of these points. In Section II we begin by commenting briefly on the descriptive content of the Report, the social problem it reveals, and the policy objectives in response to the problem. In Section III, the core of the paper, we discuss the nature of a statisticaltheoretical model necessary to handle any analysis of the determinants of educational achievement and illustrate the discussion with a hypothetical, simplified example. The purpose of this example is to indicate a relevant set of questions in terms of the objectives of social policy, and to suggest how the results from testing the statistical model should be translated into terms suitable for policy decisions. We should emphasize, however, that the example is hypothetical. The most serious gap concerning educational policy, particularly compensatory education, remains that of an inadequate theory, and we cannot fill that gap. In Section IV of the paper we do, however, discuss a few of the many specific variables which are found in the Coleman Report to at least illustrate the points made in our hypothetical example and methodological discussion.
Our comments will be seen to take a predominantly negative tone.
We admit that we are, at this time, so disenchanted with the theorerĩ cal and statistical methodology of the Coleman Report that we are pessimistic about what can be learned from it that will be useful for policy purposes. 2
II. Policy Objectives Underlying the Coleman Report
A statement of a desirable or at least acceptable objective for social policy is provided by Coleman himself.
From the perspective of society, it assumes that what is important is not to "equalize the schools" in some formal sense, but to insure that children from all groups come into adult society so equipped as to insure their full participation in this society. Another way of putting this is to say that the schools are successful only insofar as they reduce the dependence of a child's opportunities upon his social origins. We can think of a set of conditional probabilities: the probability of being prepared for a given occupation or for a given college at the end of high school, conditional upon the child's social origins. The effectiveness of the schools consists, in part, of making the conditional probabilities less conditional--that is, less dependent upon social origins. Thus, equality of educational opportunity implies, not merely "equal" schools, but equally effective schools, whose influences will overcome the differences in starting point of children from different social groups. [8, p. 72] 2Thos e who have witnessed the reception given the Report since its publication will recognize that our view of its statistical methodology stands in sharp contrast to the praise generally accorded this aspect of the Report. (See, for example, [3] , [5] , [6] .) This reception has, indeed, increased the urgency we feel about pointing its weaknesses.
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The task of translating the objective of equality of educational opportunity into operational terms, however, is a difficult one. The problem is, first, that the objective rests on a proposition which can be assumed but is not proven; and second, that the assessment of progress toward that objective requires measuring instruments that have yet to be perfected. These points may be spelled out as follows:
1. We can (and shall) assume that the average level of innate ability to perform in school is relatively similar across racial groups and, with only slightly less confidence, across economic classes. Lower economic classes do, of course, receive poorer health cares including pre-natal and infant care, and the relation health has to learning capacity--revealed most starkly among those mental retardates whose affliction can be traced to poor health care--suggests that innate ability or learning capacity at school ages may well be lower on average for the poorer groups. Despite this sort of relationship between class and ability, we might still accept the assumption that, say, the median levels af ability are roughly similar across race and class groups.
2. When we seek to raise the educational achievement levels of individual students, we have in mind building the achievement on a given base of innate ability, and then testing to determine whether the achievement is at some desired level, given the ability factor. A serious obstacle to this approach is that our current measuring instruments are clearly not able to discSiminate between ability factors and achievement factors. 4 The median is relatively insensitive to the location of the tails of the distribution--a fact that increases the acceptability of our working assumption. We set aside the question of how the dispersion or the distribution of innate-abilities compares across groups.
5·The problem of inadequate measuring instruments is emphasized in Mosteller, "Report of the Harvard SEEOR Group A, " May 11, 1967, in [4,pp. 
One way to cope with the measurement problem is to rely heavily on the assumption under point 1 above--the assumption of relative simi1arity in average abilities. On this basis, changes in factors (other than ability) which bring about educational achievement may be implemented, and the success of this effort may be tested by achievement scores that are correspondingly averaged over relatively large groups.
Such a focus on instruments of public policy to narrow the gaps between average levels of educational attainment across racial and economic groups has several implications:
1. The first priority is to develop a model in which the selection of variables is governed by a distinction between those variables amenable to policy manipulation and those that are not. The use of non-policy variables may be desirable for (a) stratifying the population if we think the policy variables have different effects on different groups, and (b) controlling for intervening effects which otherwise may bias the statistical measures of the effe~ts of policy variables. Adding non-policy variables also serves to reduce residual variation (i.e., to increase the R 2 ); but with the current availability of large sample sizes this may not have a high priority, particularly since problems of interpreting the statistical results arise as more and more variables are added ,some. of which inevitably overlap into the role of a policy variable. rae policy variables in the model of educational achievement must, of course, be relevant to the level of the decision makers for whom the The role of a variable in affecting objectives can only take on GOne justification for selecting verbal ability was that this variable possessed the largest relative inter-school variances. Another was that among the inter-student variances of test scores, school input variables accounted for more of the variance of verbal ability than of other test scores. It appears that what underlies these puzzling justifications is a preoccupation with II getting large R2 I S ,1I about which we will have a good deal to criticize in the next section. Suffice it to say here that the R2 criterion is not relevant. What~relevant (but nowhere forthcoming in the Report) is a defense of such a verbal ability test as being a valid measure of educational achievement that is related, on the basis of a hypothesis concerning the determinants of educational achievement, to a specified set of school input variables. Instead, the fact that the verbal ability test is less likely to abe affected by the variation of school cQrricula a~d instruction than are some of the other tests is offered as further Justification for settling upon the verbal ability test~(See pages 293 ff in=, the Report [1] .) meaning and be interpretable in the context of a carefully specified and theoretically justified model; (2) when we have such a model in the form of a regression equation, an appropriately scaled regression coefficient is our most useful statistic measuring the importance of the variable for the purposes of policy action. The second point, which is the more specific, is discussed first. where the s symbol refers to the sample standard deviations and R Z .
a1.
is the coefficient of multiple determination for the "auxiliary" 8 Z 2 R ai is the same statistic as the C referred to by Coleman in his reply [7] to the comment by Bowles and LeVin [2] . Note, however that Coleman' s~efinition of the "unique contrioution" of a variable, which involves C , is in error unless the variable whose contribution is being assessed has a unit variance. ( [7] , pp. 241-242). It should be clear that measuring Il s trength" by the usual regression coefficients, or by the-Beta coefficients, is in general no better than using $. Whether the variables are scaled conventionally or by some equally arbitrary sample-generated unit, they will usually have to be re-adjusted to' secure comparability in the con- How did the choice of such an odd measure of "strength" come about?
The most plausible explanation runs in terms of an all-too-common failure to distinguish "statistical significance" from policy or "substantive significance." In fact the F-ratio test statistic, which is commonly used to test the hypothesis that one or several coefficients in a linear function are equal to zero, is very simply related to~. In the one variable case, the F-ratio is strictly proportional to~:
where t = sample size, and k = number of independent variables in the regression.
Where F is greater than some critical value, one commonly reports that the variable in question is significantly greater than zero at, say, the .05 level. All this means is that in order to maintain a belief that the variable in question has absolutely no effect, one must believe that the sample analyzed has surmounted odds of 20 to one 9Indeed, an important advantage of the ordinary regression coefficient, bi' is that, since the units in which x. are measured are customarily given, the effect of a unit change ia x. on y is, as a matter of course, translated by the user of the sta~istics into terms relevant for his decision context.
It has been suggested that publication of the regression coefficients produced by Coleman's research would lead to reckless and irresponsible interpretations ( [7] p. 240). This must be because either Ithe statistics themselves, or the users of them, are untrustworthy. If he problem lies with the statistics, it is hardly more responsible to p~blish statistics which are better behaved simply because they are definitionally limited to the positive numbers between 0 and 1, without~evealing the more suspi~ious-looking joint produGts of the analysis. 1-1= tbe 1;"lX'oblem H.es "liJith t.hp. f1!\~l11~t.Q"~"'l:
by showing such a large apparent effect. Clearly, the greater is~i or F, the greater the statistical significance and the harder it becomes for a betting man to stick to the belief that the partial derivative is zero. This is surely a very restricted and specialized meaning of "significance," since~t may bear no relation to the significance (i. e., importance) a variable has for policy purposes.
The F-test (or related t-test) of the "net" or "partial" coefficients is not, of course, affected by the order of introduction of the variables into a stepwise calculation of the regression. But, the effect of a variable or set of variables (however "effect" is measured)
will show up as different in the case where another set of variables is "held constant," from the case where there is no control over that other set. The only exception is when the variables to be controlled are uncorrelated with the set being examined, but this situation is present so rarely in non-experimental data that it can be dismissed.
An extensive controversy concerning the order of variables has appeared in the literature, [2] , [7] , [9] , [10] . But neither critic nor defender has presented an adequate theoretical framework within which the objects of their dispute become worth arguing about.
When there is a legitLmate interest in testing the zero-effect hypothesis, nothing else will quite do. There is an entirely unwarranted tendency, however, to use the F-statistic (or its cousin.~)
to indicate 'the more relevant kind of policy significance. To take a homely example, one might suppose that height and sugar consumption are both related to an individual's weight (among other things of course).
In mostconteKts height would explain more variance than sugar consump- of such "standardized" regression weights is usually predicated on an assumption (rarely made explicit) that the sample standard deviations (Column I and VII, where Xl and x 2 are perfectly correlated, are limiting cases--the multiple regressions would be impossible to carry out with data generated from these cases.)
The values of the various parameters listed in the columns of this table must be regarded as "population" values. A limited sample drawn at random from one of these populations could produce estimates of these parameters vlhich would differ from the "true" values by sampling errors of the~_usual sort.
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The squared simple correlationS'~YXi ,both fall initially;
;C?~i going to zero at~2 = -0.5. 10 The variance explained by x 2 falls steadily until at the limit it explains only half of the (smaller) variance of y. BeYOn~2 = -0.5 (in columns VI and VII) the simple correlation of Xl with y becomes negative, and in the limit it is simply a mirror-image of x and thus has the same squared 2 corre la t ion.
The squared multiple correlation falls as the "unexplained" component of the variance becomes relatively more important. The net or unique contributions,~., are seen to reach a peak at~12 = -0.5 and
r .
then to fall once more to zero as Xl and x 2 become more identical.
The partial correlations are seen to fall quite symmetrically on both sides of column IV where~12 = O.
Finally, the smaller variance in y brings about an increase in the Beta coefficients. By this measure the effects of both Xl and x 2 become more and more powerful; by contrast, the regression coefficients measuring their effects remain unchanged at their assigned values.
Now consider a not-entirely-hypothetical society which has shown some tendency to place its "best" schools in the "best" places and'
to direct its "best" efforts toward its "best" pupils. This produces an~2 somewhere between 0.5 and O.9--1ikeCols.' II or III. An educational survey might very well find that background and environment 10Intuitively, whe~12 = -0~5 we can think of the positive contribution of Xl to explain~ng variation in y being exactly negated because of the negative correlation between Xl and x 2 • As the negative correlation between Xl and x 2 gets larger in absolute value than -0.5, the true positive effect of Xl is more than offset in the simple relation between Xl and y (when x 2 is not held constant). In the example shown in Table 1 the "best" allocation to achieve Similarly, an Iso-chunk of x 2 is only 4% of an original unit, and hence its coefficient must be 0.08.
Several variations on the "Iso-chunk" idea can be specified. Take as given the relation between "output," y, and "inputs," xl and x 2 :
(1)
Unfortunately, one does not usually have that much confidence in a couple of simple linear relations. Commonly, relation (1) will be estimated on the basis of a limited sample, and one's confidence in extrapolations beyond the range of observed conbinations of xl and x 2 deteriorates rapidly. Moreover, one 't"ould rarely encounter a "cost function" as simple as the one in (2) --usually there will be diminishing returns causing marginal costs to rise beyond some point. Bait coefficients derived as above ought, therefore, to be interpreted as reflecting, at best, the relative effectiveness of variables in that vicinity of the data over which a linear approximation is deemed to be "sufficiently accurate," taking into account reservations about both relation (1) and relation (2).
IV. Interpreting Specific Variables in The Coleman Report
The absence of any explicit theory of. educational achievement is the chief source of the difficulty in interpreting the statistical results of the Coleman Report. We can illustrate the problem by discussing some of the variables used in the Report.
A. Attitudinal Characteristics of the Student
One remarkable finding of the report's analysis is the high partial correlation of fate control/personal efficacy variables with the verbal ability score used as a measure of educational outcomes. 12 The relation was particularly strong (by~he Report's criterion) among minority group children. Without a theory, however, we cannot answer the following types of questions:
12 A number student's sense fatalism.
of questions in the survey attempted to measure the of control over his environment and his sense of 
B· Characteristics of the Student's Peer Group
In a review of the Report's findings, Harry C. Bredemeier notes:
"More important than all school characteristics and teacher quality for Negro students is the degree to which the other students in their schools have the followin~characteristics: Their families own encyclopedias, they do not transfer much, their attendance is regular, they -~--_.. _~~~I t plan to go to college, and they spend rather much time on homework," «11], p. 21) He notes in a footnote,"I assume no one will infer from this that the 'solution' is to put encyclopedias in everyone's home."
But, is such an inference less satisfactory than making no inference? Is it any more naive than the presentation of the vague theoretical framework that permits us almost no grounds for saying how we our hypothetical theory has told us up to now is that: (1) if it is intellectual atmosphere that underlies the relation, the variable has probably no policy significance since we do not know much about changing intellectual atmosphere. If we thought we did know something about how to make the change, we would need to know the specification of the relation between encyclopedias and intellectual atmosphere.
(2) If it is affluence that underlies the relation, then we need to ask our theory to translate a unit of encyclopedias to a unit of wealth (or income flow) so that we know how much of a change in income will be necessary to yield the changes in educational performance.
We could continue these "if" questions almost indefinitely, but let us summarize the function of our hypothetical theory by saying that it has forced us to consider the possible tortured interpretations we have to make or preposterous policy actions we might have to follow as a consequence of such cavalier inclusion of ad hoc variabIes in our model.
c. Environmental Characteristics
The Coleman Report stressed that the influence of the regional and urban location of the school and the socio-economic status of the student body in the school were highly important in explaining school performance. A theoretical proposition underlying the authors' interpretation of this finding was that the environment is exogenous and "causally prior" to such factors as school resources, so that an appropriate procedure was to enter the former variables, note the contribution
to R , and then add the school resource variables and observe their 2 additional contribution to R. Other demurrers to the procedure, quite of Negroes or low SES groups, we should consider the hypothesis that the latter families have strong "tastes" for a high quality education for their children and have moved to a district where the school has a favorable reputation. The observed positive effect of the environment on the educational achievement of disadvantaged groups may therefore be overstated, since some of the effect stems from the unmeasured personal traits of the families, and it is further possible that some effect is attributable to the beneficial resources of the school.
More generally, any variation in school performance that is attributed to the urban-rural or regional location of the school cannot be "set aside" so that the remaining variation can be examined in de- 
D. Teacher Quality
One type of variable that belongs in the category of school resources over which we have some degree of policy control is "teacher quality"--itself a composite concept made up of several-variab1es. The conclusion in the Report about teacher "quality appears to strike a rare optimistic note regarding the beneficial influence school resources can have in compensatory educational efforts. The Report states on page 317 that "a given investment in upgrading teacher quality will
have the most effect on achievement in underprivileged areas." Surely, the theoretical justification for this variable should be quite firm.
Moreover, the wording of the Report's conclusion exactly fits the criterion we have requested for assessing each variable.
Unfortunately, the statistical evidence in support of the finding the authors present concerns "variance explained": "Given the fact that no school factors (excluding student body composition) account for much variation in achievement, teachers' characteristics account for more than any other." And, "by the 12th grade, teacher variables account for more than nine percent of the variance among Negro students, two percent among white students" (page 325). It is perhaps superfluous to mention again that this ranking of importance of a variable in terms of variance explained does not tell us what the "bait coefficients" are, nor permit us to derive them; therefore, the conclusion about a Il given investment in upgrading teacher quality" for underprivileged areas is not supported. If, for example, the variance of verbal ability was large among teachers of Negro students and the educational achievement scores had a relatively small variance, the high partial correlation coefficient of this variable would be consistent with a small value for the bait coefficient--even setting aside cost considerations. (See the formulas on pp. 12 and 26 of this paper.)
The full complement of variables representing teacher characteristics is, itself, not very reassuring. In section 2 of the Coleman
Report we learn that Negro children are being taught by teachers who (to a significantly greater extent than teachers of white children):
(1) have low verbal scores (2) have been born and educated in a county where they are now teaching 35 (3) rate their students as low either on motivation or achievement (4) lack desire to teach high ability students.
We submit that only item (1) in this list has any clear connection to teaching quality as it links up to educational achievement, but, again, this issue can only be resolved by an explicit theory which would justify the proper linkages and which would precede empirical testing.
E. School Resourc~s
Perhaps the single category of variables most susceptible to policy manipulation is that of school resources. Unfortunately, the variables used to measure sheool resources are very much like the "encyclopedias in the home" we discussed above. It is difficult The sort of questions we have been posing serves to illustrate the two weaknesses we have noted previously. First and foremost is the absence of an explicit underlying theory with which to interpret the "facts" reported in the statistical work of the Coleman Report. If the questions we have raised are overly demanding of the state of theoretical knowledge about the educational processes, we can only say that this shaky base should be made explicit. Perhaps researchers will be led to work with a more simplified-model that can be well specified and interpreted--better this than a complex model that defies interpretation.
l3The complexity of this specification need not be exaggerated. There are many decision contexts in which proxy variables may represent a bundle of heterogeneous components, and it may not be worthwhile or expedient for the decision maker to distinguish among the components to determine their separate measures of effectiveness. What is necessary, however, is some translation of a unit of the proxy variable into a unit of the larger bundle (along with, eventually, Some measure of the costs of the larger bundle). 14The term was used by Daniel P. Moynihan [12] in the context of his criticism that i1 educationists"--administrators, teC)chers, research personne1--have shirked their responsibilities to evaluate their perf-ormance and have attempted to use "technica1 li criticism of the Coleman Report as an excuse for continued inaction.
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